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Booth: Estates in Fee Tail and the Rule in Shelley's Case in Florida

ESTATES IN FEE TAIL AND THE RULE IN
SHELLEY'S CASE IN FLORIDA
ANNE CAWTHON BooTH*

Estates in fee tail and the Rule in Shelley's Case are part of the
common law heritage of most American jurisdictions. Both of these
concepts of the law of real property were developed in a feudal
society and are the outcome of the centuries-old struggle by the
great land-owning families to maintain their supremacy.' The estate
in fee tail has not been a popular institution in this country.2 The
Rule in Shelley's Case is also in disfavor, because it often operates
to defeat the intent of the transferor.3 In most jurisdictions it is
no longer possible to create an estate in fee tail, 4 and the Rule in
Shelley's Case has been abolished.5
A consideration of estates in fee tail is not, however, of purely
academic interest. Statutes prohibiting the creation of estates in
fee tail and those abolishing the Rule in Shelley's Case cannot
constitutionally operate retroactively to extinguish vested interests
that arose prior to passage of the statutes.6 The Florida Supreme
Court as recently as 19527 applied the Rule in Shelley's Case in a
decision involving a deed that was executed prior to passage of the
statute abolishing the Rule.8
Individuals unaware of the legal implications continue to make
use of language creating an estate in fee tail or calling for the ap*B.S. Ag. 1956, LL.B. 1961, University of Florida.
1. See Dick v. Ricker, 222 Ill. 413, 420, 78 N.E. 823, 825 (1906) (dictum); Ewing
v. Nesbitt, 88 Kan. 708, 711, 129 Pac. 1131, 1133 (1913) (dictum); Note, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 316, 317 (1935).
2. See e.g., Albers v. Donovan, 371 Ill. 458, 460, 21 N.E.2d 563, 564 (1939)
(dictum). But see, eg., Ewing v. Nesbitt, supra note 1, at 716, 129 Pac. at 1134
(dictum): "The overweening propensity to perpetuate family name and family
property which made estates tail so obnoxious in the middle ages is fairly curbed
by the right of a tenant in tail to convert his tenancy into a fee simple and is
not a menace to the general welfare of the people of this state; and it will be
remembered that this right became one of the characteristics of the estate."
3.

2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §344 (3d ed. 1939); Foster, The Rule in Shelley's

Case in Nebraska, 8 NEB. L. BULL. 124, 151, 153 (1929).
4.

See 19 Am. JUR. Estates §§46, 55 (1939);REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY ch. 5, in-

troductory note at 201-11 (1936).
5. See 26 CJ.S. Deeds 953, n.50 (1942); 18 C.J. Deeds 320, n.97 (1919).
6. Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P.2d 1085 (1939); see I TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY §35 (3d ed. 1939); Day, Real Property 82-86 (unpublished materials
used for instruction at the University of Florida College of Law).

7. National Turpentine & Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills, 57 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1952),
6 U. FLA. L. REv. 578 (1953).
8. FLA. STAT. §689.17 (1959), effective June 11, 1945.
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Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1961

1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Florida Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [1961], Art. 2

plication of the Rule in Shelley's Case." The ability to recognize a
transfer that would have created an estate in fee tail at common law
is necessary even in jurisdictions that prohibit entailment. Most statutes prohibiting the creation of an estate in fee tail specify the effect
that shall be given to such a transfer, 0 but in order to apply the
statute it must first be determined that the instrument in question
would have created an estate in fee tail at common law."
PART I.

ESTATES IN FEE TAIL

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

Origin
In England prior to 1285, a conveyance of Blackacre "to A and the
heirs of his body" created an estate in fee simple conditional.12 The
donee, A, obtained a fee simple, conditioned on his having heirs of
his body. The donor retained a possibility of reverter. If A had issue
at the time of the conveyance or subsequent thereto, he could convey
Blackacre in fee simple absolute; but if A died without having conveyed Blackacre and leaving no heirs of his body, the land reverted to
A's donor in fee simple absolute. 3 After the birth of a child, A could
convey Blackacre to B in fee simple absolute; and if he did so the
fact that he died without heirs of his body would not cause Blackacre
to revert to A's donor.
The ability of A to alienate the land after the birth of issue defeated the intent of A's grantor that the fee simple conditional estate
should terminate if A's lineal descendants should ever become extinct. 4
The great land-owning families were not to stand idly by and see
their reversionary interest thus destroyed. In 1285 they secured the
enactment of the Statute de Donis. 5
The purpose of the Statute de Donis was to prevent alienation by
the grantee of an estate in fee simple conditional so as to bar his
issue or cut off the grantor's possibility of reverter. 6 As a result of
the statute, a conveyance after 1285 "to A and the heirs of his body"
9. Dolye v. Andis, 127 Iowa 36, 69, 102 N.W. 177, 188 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
10. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY CI. 5, topic 2, titles C, D, E, F (1936).
11. Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future Interests. 45 VA. L. REv. 339,
350 (1959); 19 AMi. JUR. Estates 507 (1939); 26 C.J.S. Deeds 924 (1942).
12. See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *110; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §34
(3d ed. 1939).
13. Sagers v. Sagers, 158 Iowa 729, 138 N.W. 911 (1912); see 19 A,%. JuR. Estates
498-99 (1939).
14. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §34 (3d ed. 1939).
15. Statute of Westminster 2, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 1.
16. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 49 (3d ed. 1939).
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gave rise to an estate in fee tail instead of an estate in fee simple
7
conditional.1
The estate in fee tail has been defined as follows:' 8
"[A]n estate of inheritance which, if left to itself, will after
the death of the first owner, pass to his lawful issue, including
children, grandchildren and more remote descendants, so long
as his posterity endures, in the regular order of descent from
such owner and will terminate on the failure of such posterity."
The estate in fee tail differs from the estate in fee simple conditional in several important respects.' 9 The donee of an estate in
fee simple conditional becomes the owner of the land in fee on the
birth of issue. An estate in fee tail, however, descends to the donee's
heirs named in the gift. The grantor of an estate in fee simple conditional retains a mere possibility of reverter, 20 but the grantor of an
estate in fee tail has a true reversion21 and thus may create remainder
interests to follow the estate in fee tail.
Creation
In order to convey an estate in fee tail at common law it is
necessary to use the word heirs in its technical sense as a word of
limitation,22 but the words of his body may be replaced by other
words of similar import.23 A conveyance "to A and his heirs, issue
of his body" creates an estate in fee tail in A. 2 4 The majority of
the states recognizing estates in fee tail no longer require the word
heirs for the creation of an estate in fee tail. 25 Even at common law
the word heirs is not necessary for the creation by will of an estate
in fee tail.'2 Thus a devise "to A and the issue of his body" may
27
create an estate in fee tail.

17. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY ch. 5, introductory note at 203 (1936).
18. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 49 (3d ed. 1939).
19. See I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§34, 47 (3d ed. 1939).
20. Possibility of reverter is the right of a grantor to have the land revert to
him on termination of the estate granted. This right is not an estate but the mere
possibility of acquiring an estate. See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §314 (3d ed.

1939).
21. A reversion is an estate that remains in a grantor who transfers less than
his entire interest in the land, thus depriving himself of the right to present possession. See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §311a (3d ed. 1939).
22. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§38, 39 (3d ed. 1939).
23. See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *115.
24. 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §37 (3d ed. 1939).
25. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §59, comment d (1936).

26.

1 TIFFANY,

REAL PROPERTY

§39 (3d ed. 1939).

27. See 95 C.J.S. Wills §666, 96 C.J.S. Wills §862 (1957) for discussion and lists
of cases involving use of the word issue in wills.
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The owner of any inheritable freehold interest in land can create
an estate in fee tail, 28 various types of which are possible. 29 A limitation "to A and the heirs of his body" creates an estate in fee tail
general. An estate in fee tail special is created by a limitation "to A
and the heirs of his body by his wife, B." General and special estates
tail may be further restricted to male or female heirs. A limitation
"to A and the heirs male of his body" creates a fee tail male general.
An estate in fee tail female special is created by a limitation "to A
and the heirs female of his body by his wife, B." An estate in fee
tail is inherited from generation to generation by lineal descendants
of the type specified. Failure of the specified lineal descendants at
any time in the future will cause the estate to revert to the original
donor or his heirs.
Barringthe Entail
The Statute de Donis was unpopular with everyone except the
members of the landed aristocracy, who were usually the holders of
the reversionary interests protected by the statute.30 Attempts to
amend the statute failed; 31 but the enterprising lawyers of the day,
with the aid of the courts and by sufferance of Edward IV, devised a
way to circumvent the statute. In Taltarum's Case32 the court held
that a tenant in fee tail could, by means of a collusive suit known as
a common recovery, convey in fee simple absolute and bar his lineal
descendants, the owner of the reversionary interest, and the owners of
any remainder interest following the estate in fee tail. Further, the
tenant in fee tail could make such a conveyance regardless of whether
he had issue. A statute passed in 1541 empowered the tenant in tail
33
to bar the entail by means of another collusive suit known as a fine.
A conveyance by fine did not, however, bar the owner of the reversion
3
or the owners of any remainders following the estate in fee tail. '
Statutory Changes
Estates in fee tail had been completely abolished in thirty-three
28. 1 REDFERN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA §165 (3d ed.
1957).
29. See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *113; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §36 (3d
ed. 1939).
30. See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *116 for recital of the "infinite difficulties
and disputes" occasioned by estates in fee tails for 200 years after passage of the
Statute de Donis.
31. DIGBY, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 253, n.1 (5th ed. 1897).
32. Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, f. 19, pl. 25 (1473).
33. 32 Hen. 8, ch. 36 (1541).
34. See Ewing v. Nesbitt, 88 Kan. 708, 711, 129 Pac. 1131, 1133 (1913) (dictum)
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states and the District of Columbia as of January 1, 1947.35 In Iowa,
Oregon, and South Carolina, neither the Statute de Donis nor statutes
prohibiting the creation of an estate in fee simple conditional are in
effect; 36 consequently a limitation sufficient since 1285 to create an
estate tail at common law gives rise to the old estate in fee simple
conditional in those states. 37 In at least four 3 8 of the remaining jurisdictions it was possible as of January 1, 1947, to create an estate in
fee tail.
Jurisdictions abolishing estates in fee tail may be grouped into
four categories, depending on the effect given to a limitation purporting to create an estate in fee tail, after entailment has been prohibited. Twenty-five states 39 and the District of Columbia have statutes providing that limitations sufficient at common law to create
estates in fee tail now create estates in fee simple absolute. Eight
other states40 have statutes providing that a limitation sufficient at
common law to create an estate in fee tail creates an estate for life
in the first taker, remainder in fee simple absolute in the surviving
issue of the first taker.
A third approach is that of Hawaii, where it was early established
by judicial decision- that neither estates in fee tail nor estates in
fee simple conditional could be created. A limitation that would
have created an estate in fee tail at common law creates either an
estate in fee simple in the first taker or an estate for life in the first
taker, remainder in fee simple to those who become the heirs of his
body at his death, depending on the intention of the parties. In case
of doubt, the presumption favors the creation of an estate in fee simple
42
absolute.
Texas illustrates the fourth approach. Since 1836 the Declaration
for discussion of fines and common recoveries and effect on the estate in fee tail.
See also 19 Am.

JUR.

Estates §50 (1939).

35. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY ch. 5, introductory note (1936, Supp. 1948).
36. Id. at special note 1.
37. Sagers v. Sagers, 138 Iowa 729, 138 N.W. 911 (1912); Lytle v. Hulen, 128
Ore. 483, 275 Pac. 45 (1929); Blume v. Pearcy, 204 S.C. 409, 29 S.E.2d 673 (1944).
38. Del., Me., Mass., R.I., (by deed but not by will). See REsrATEMENT, PROPERTY ch. 5, introductory note, special note 2 (1936, Supp. 1948).
39. Ala., Ariz., Cal., Ga., (as to some types of conveyances), Ind., Ky., Md.,
Mich., Minn., Miss., Mont., Neb., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Okla., Pa., S.
Dak., Tenn., Vt., Va., W. Va., Wis. See REsTATEMENT, PROPERTY ch. 5, introductory

note, special note 4 (Supp. 1948), setting out the statutes of these jurisdictions.
40. Ark., Colo., Fla., Ga. (as to some types of conveyances), Ill., Kan., Mo., N.M.
See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY ch. 5, introductory note, special note 5 (Supp. 1948),
setting out the statutes of these states.
41. Kinney v. Oahu Sugar Co., 23 Hawaii 747 (1917), afj'd, 255 Fed. 732 (1919);
Nahaolelua v. Heen, 20 Hawaii 372 (1911).
42. Rosenbledt v. Wodehouse, 25 Hawaii 561 (1920); Kinney v. Oahu Sugar
Co., supra note 41.
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of Rights of the Texas Constitution 4 3 has prohibited the creation of
estates in fee tail without specifying what effect should be given to a
will or deed containing a limitation that would have created an
estate in fee tail at common law. The position of Texas is similar
to that taken by Florida prior to 194144 in that entailment was prohibited but the results of a purported transfer in fee tail were not
specified. Texas has judicially decided the question, however. In
Calder v. Davidson45 the court was called on to construe a conveyance
"to A and the heirs of her body by her then husband." The court
held that such a limitation would have created an estate in fee tail
special at common law, but that since estates tail are forbidden in
Texas, the deed vested a fee simple title in the first taker.
FEE TAIL IN FLORIDA

Florida adopted the common and statutory law of England as
it existed on July 4, 1776, including the Statute de Donis. 4 0 Fines

and common recoveries were part of the common law as adopted by
Florida, 4 but they have since been abolished by statute.48 Although
there are no reported cases, presumably it was possible to create
an estate in fee tail in Florida prior to November 17, 1829.40
November 17, 1829, to July 1,1941
On November 17, 1829, the Legislative Council of the Territory
of Florida enacted the following statute: "No real estate shall be
entailed in this state."5 0 This statute governs transfers that became
operative between November 17, 1829, and July 1, 1941. The statute
does not specify the result of a limitation sufficient at common law
to create an estate in fee tail, and the question is uncertain today.1
5 2
The position taken in the Restatement of Property
is that when
entailing is prohibited without any express direction as to what
estate will be created by a limitation sufficient at common law to
43. TEXAS CONST. art 1, §26.
44. Fi. CoMP. GEN. LAWS §5481 (1927).
45. 59 S.W. 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
46. See McLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 427 (1861); 1 REDFERN, infra note 61, §165, But
cf. Botts, British Statutes in Force in the State of Florida, 3 FLA. STAT. 1941, pp.
5-79 (1943).
47. See Newman v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 119 Fla. 641, 160 So. 745 (1935).
48. FL.A. STAT. §689.08 (1959).
49. See 1 REDFERN, infra note 61, at 281.
50. FLA. CoMP. GEN. LAWS §5481 (1927).
51. Day, Real Property 88 (1952) (unpublished materials used for instruction
at University of Florida College of Law).
52. 1 REsTATEMNENT, PROPERTY §104 and comment b (1936).
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create an estate in fee tail, a fee simple absolute construction is
preferred. This view is based in part on the fact that the estate in
fee simple absolute more nearly approximates the estate in fee tail.
The intention of the transferor would more nearly be carried out,
therefore, by a construction favoring a fee simple absolute in the
first taker rather than a life estate with the remainder in fee to those
3
who will become the heirs of his body at his death.
54
The Florida case of Gonzales v. Hooten has been cited as indicating that the position of the Restatement is the law in Florida
for the period under consideration.-5 However, the Gonzales case
is doubtful authority for the position that Florida might take as to
the effect of a limitation "to A and the heirs of his body" that became operative between November 17, 1829, and July 1, 1941. The
Court in Gonzales did not consider itself to be confronted with this
problem, but the case does seem to favor a fee simple absolute in the
first taker under a conveyance purporting to create an estate in fee
tail.-o
Gonzales involved an inter vivos transfer to trustees, who were to
convey certain land to Gonzales when he became twenty-one, on the
following condition: 57
"[I]f the said Gonzales have heirs of his body in being at ...
his death, the said property shall descend in due course to
said heirs, but if at the time of his death, he have no heirs of
his body in being, then if the (grantor) be living, the said
property shall revert to, and the title thereof revert [sic] in the
(grantor), or, if at said time the said (grantor) shall have
departed this life, then the said property shall belong to' two
religious bodies."
When Gonzales reached his twenty-first birthday the trustees conveyed
the land to him, but the nature of the conveyance was not disclosed.
Subsequently he conveyed the land in fee simple absolute and died
survived by a son. Gonzales' grantee successfully defended his title
to the land against the claim of Gonzales' son. The Court held that
the only way the trustees could comply with the directions of the
trust was by conveying title to Gonzales in fee simple absolute, subject to the limitations over in the event he died without heirs of
his body. When he died survived by an heir of his body the limitations over were defeated. His grantee, therefore, had title to the land
in fee simple absolute.
53. Ibid.
54. 63 Fla. 163, 58 So. 245 (1912).
55.

2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §197 (1950).

56. See Day, supra note 51, at 89.
57. 63 Fla. at 164, 58 So. at 245.
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The later case of Arnold v. Wells"8 seems to favor a life estate in
the first taker, remainder to the heirs of his body at his death, when
the transfer purports to create an estate in fee tail. This result is in
accord with Florida's later statutory approach.5 9 The Arnold case involved a devise to Arnold for life, and at his death to the heirs of
his body and their heirs and assigns forever, but if he should die
without heirs of his body, to the heirs of the testatrix. The donor
died, and Arnold died without heirs of his body. His widow claimed
his interest in fee simple absolute. The Court held that Arnold had
only a life estate; consequently, the title vested on his death in the
heirs of the testatrix.
The Court found that, but for the statute prohibiting entailment
in Florida, the limitation would have given Arnold an estate in fee
tail through the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case. The Rule,
which was in force in Florida at the time s ° could not be applied in
this instance because of the statutory prohibition. The case is not
authority for the position that a limitation "to A and the heirs of
his body" creates a life estate in the first taker, remainder to those who
become the heirs of his body at his death. The limitation was to
Arnold for life, remainder to the heirs of his body and their heirs
and assigns forever; this limitation could not create an estate in fee
tail in Arnold without the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case.61
The Court held that the Rule could not be applied when the result
would violate the statute prohibiting entailment; therefore, by the
Court's reasoning, the prohibited estate never arose.
There is language in the Arnold case,62 however, that might lend
support to an argument in favor of a construction giving a life estate
to the first taker, remainder in fee to those who become the heirs of
his body at his death. If a case involving the construction of a purported transfer in fee tail that became operative between November
17, 1829, and July 1, 1941, were to arise today, the Florida Court
58. 100 Fla. 1470, 131 So. 400 (1930).
59. FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1959).
60. 100 Fla. at 1477, 131 So. at 404.
61. 1 REDFERN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA §166 (3d ed.
1957).
62. 100 Fla. at 1477, 131 So. at 404: "Under this statute [FLA. CoMaP. GEN. LAWS
§5481 (1927)] we find no authority for enlarging by construction the life estate

expressly given by the will to Campbell Elmore Arnold to a fee-simple estate."
But see Redfern, Estates Tail in Florida, 6 FLA. L.J. 69, 70 (1932) (discussing the
Arnold case): "As there is no statute in the State of Florida which changes an

estate tail into a life estate, it becomes interesting to determine how the Supreme
Court of Florida, without violating settled rules of the common law, reached the
conclusion that the words in item one of the will under consideration, which
under common law rules would create an estate tail, created a life estate in this
instance."

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol14/iss3/2
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could adopt the position of the Restatement63 and find support in
Gonzales, at least by implication, for a fee simple absolute construction.
Later statutory enactments in Florida 64 and some of the language in
Arnold could support a construction by the Court that the transfer
gave a life estate in the first taker, remainder in fee to those who
became the heirs of his body at his death.
July 1,1941 to June 11, 1945
The Florida legislature, by a statute effective July 1, 1941, amended
the original statute prohibiting entailment that had been in effect
since November 17, 1829.5 The amended statute reads as follows:

6C

"No real estate shall be entailed in this state. Any. instrument purporting to create an estate tail shall, notwithstanding
the rule in Shelly's [sic] case be deemed to create an estate for
life in the first taker (that is in the donee or tenant in tail)
with remainder per stirpes to the issue of the first taker in being
at the time of his death."
This statute is not retroactive. It controls transfers that became
operative between July 1, 1941, and June 11, 1945. No reported cases
construing the 1941 amended statute have been found.
The 1941 statute would apply to the attempted creation of an
express estate in fee tail.67 At common law an express estate in fee
is created by a limitation "to A and the heirs of his body."6 8 The
statute applies equally to estates in fee tail that arise through the
operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case. A limitation "to A for life,
remainder to the heirs of his body" will result in A's taking an immediate estate in fee tail through the operation of the Rule in
Shelley's Case.6 9 Presumably the 1941 statute also applies to estates
in fee tail that arise by implication.70 An implied estate in fee tail
arises at common law when there is a transfer "to A and his heirs,
and upon his dying without issue, then to B and his heirs." 71
The legal effect of all three types of transfers is the same under
63.

1

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§104 and comment b (1936).

64. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20954, §2 at 2505, repealed by FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1959).
65. FLA. COMP. GEN. LAws §5481 (1927).
66. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20954, *2 at 2505.
67. Rogers, Chapter20,954, Acts of 1941, 15 FLA. L.J. 276, 277 (1941).
68. 1 REDFERN, supra note 61, at 274.
69. Id. at 283.
70. Rogers, supra note 67, at 277: "There has been some criticism of this
amendment. It is claimed that the statute does not cover an implied estate tail,
which by the way, is a rather rare bird. The writer's opinion is that the section
covers estates attempted to be entailed either expressly or by implication."
71. 19 Am. JUR. Estates §54 (1939); see 1 REDERN, supra note 61, at 274.
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the 1941 statute. It is clear that in each instance the first taker or
tenant in tail has only a life estate. It is also clear that if the first
taker under the deed or devise is survived by issue, the remainder
vests in those of his issue that survive him; and the transferor's reversion, as well as any remainder interest following the attempted
estate in fee tail, is extinguished. The result under the 1941 statute
is not so clear when the first taker is not survived by issue, since
the statute does not specify what result obtains when there is a
failure of issue. A spokesman for the committee of The Florida
Bar responsible for the drafting of the 1941 statute made this statement: 72
"The amended statute does not say so, but, of course, failure
of issue would result in a reversion to the grantor (or testator)
or his heirs or devisees. Perhaps it might have been better
to have stated this also."
Presumably the estate would revert to the donor, on failure of issue
of the first taker, only after any remainder interests had been satisfied.
June 11, 1945, to Date
Florida's present statute, which became effective June 11, 1945, and
which repealed the act of 1941, provides as follows:73
"No property, real or personal, shall be entailed in this
state. Any instrument purporting to create an estate tail, express or implied, shall be deemed to create an estate for life
in the first taker with remainder per stirpes to the lineal descendants of the first taker in being at the time of his death.
If the remainder fails for want of such remaindermen, then it
shall vest in any other remaindermen designated in such instrument, or, if there is no such designation, then it shall revert
to the original donor or to his heirs."
This statute, like its predecessors, is not retroactive. It controls
transfers that became operative on or after June 11, 1945. Implied
as well as express estates in fee tail are specifically covered by the
present statute. The result obtaining on failure of lineal descendants
is set out.
It is interesting to note that the legislature extended the prohibition against entailment to personal property. At common law
estates in fee tail cannot be created in personal property. 74 The Rule
72.

Rogers, supra note 67, at 277.

73.

FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1959).

74.

19 AM. JUR. Estates §48 (1939).
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in Shelley's Case also does not apply to personal property, 7 but under
a related doctrine an attempt to create an estate in personalty results
in the immediate donee's taking an absolute interest.70 These common77
law principles have been recognized in a number of Florida cases
arising under the predecessors of the present statute. Some of the
cases recognizing the common law rule that the attempted entailment
of personal property will vest an absolute interest in the immediate
donee78 have nevertheless suggested that an interest in personal
property analogous to an estate in fee tail could be created in Florida.
In Bross v. Bross the Florida Supreme Court, speaking through
9
Justice Terrell, said:7
"On the question of remainders in personal property
it is quite true that in the early period of the law future estates, remainders or estates tail in personal property were not
permitted. If language devising realty creates an estate tail
it will pass an absolute title if the property is personalty.
While not followed by all courts, this rule has been frequently
followed in the construction of wills. .

.

. This rule is not an

inflexible one, but like others with reference to the interpretation of wills, it gives way to the intention of the testator.
It is of common law vintage and like others of its class it is
by necessity being modernized to include personalty as well as
realty."
In view of the Bross case and others 0 suggesting the possibility of
entailment of personal property, the Florida legislature was justified
in extending the coverage of the present statute to include personalty.8 '
The present Florida statute prohibiting entailment has removed
the uncertainties existent under its predecessors; estates in fee tail
apparently have been abolished in Florida.8 2 In this respect Florida
is more fortunate than some of her sister states, whose statutes purporting to achieve the same results have met with less than complete
8 3

success.

75. 47 AM. JUR. Rule in Shelley's Case §24 (1943).
76. 1 REDFERN, supra note 61, at 274.
77. Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936); Story v. First Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); McLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 427 (1861);
Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105 (1860).
78. See Bross v. Bross, supra note 77; cf. McLeod v. Dell, supra note 77; Russ
v. Russ, supra note 77.
79. 123 Fla. 758, 768, 167 So. 669, 673 (1936).
80. McLeod v. Dell, supra note 77; Russ v. Russ, supra note 77.
81. FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1959).
82. See I REDFERN, supra note 61, at 281.
83. See Comments, 10 ARK. L. REv. 181 (1956); 21 U. KAN. CITY L. Ruv. 210
(1953).
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PART II. THE RuLE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

Origin and Operation
The Rule in Shelley's Case takes its name from the case of Wolfe
v. Shelley,8 4 decided in 1581, but the doctrine embodied in the rule
was recognized at least two centuries earlier.85 The original reason
for the development of the doctrine is unknown and is subject to much
speculation.
Two basic situations call for the operation of the Rule in Shelley's
Case. First, a conveyance or devise "to A for life, remainder to the
heirs of A" will result in A's taking an estate in fee simple absolute.80
The Rule, operating on the remainder limited "to the heirs of A,"
gives that remainder to A in fee simple. A then has a life estate and
a remainder in fee. At this point the Rule in Shelley's Case is satisfied, and the doctrine of merger 87 comes into play, uniting the two
estates held by A to give A an immediate estate in fee simple absolute.
The second basic situation calling for the operation of the Rule
in Shelley's Case arises when there is a limitation by conveyance or
devise "to A for life, remainder to the heirs of the body of A.'88 The
Rule operates in this situation to give A a remainder in fee tail.89
Since A then holds both estates, the lesser life estate is merged into
the greater estate in fee tail, and A has an estate in fee tail.
The earliest concise statement of the Rule in Shelley's Case was
given by Coke in his report of the case itself:.9 °
"[Wihen the ancestor by any gift or conveyance takes an
estate of freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate
is limited either mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or
in tail ... ; the heirs are words of limitation of the estate, and
not words of purchase."
From this statement of the Rule, five requirements for its application
may be distinguished: 91 (1) a freehold estate in the first taker; (2) a
limitation by way of remainder to the heir or heirs of the body of
84.

1 Co. Rep. 936, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1579-81).

85.

2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 82 (3d ed. 1939).

86. Depley v. Dyer, 312 Il1. 537, 144 N.E. 212 (1924); McElwain v. Whitacre, 251
Pa. 279, 96 At. 655 (1916).
87. This doctrine applies whenever a greater and a lesser estate are held by
the same person. See, e.g., Walter J. Dolan Properties v. Vonnequt, 133 Fla. 854,
184 So. 757 (1938).
88. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1939).
89. E.g., Gamble v. Gamble, 200 Ala. 176, 75 So. 924 (1917); Bibo v. Bibo, 397
Ill. 505, 74 N.E.2d 808 (1947).
90. Wolfe v. Shelley, I Co. Rep. 936, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 234 (K.B. 1579-81).
91. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §346 (3d ed. 1939).
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the first taker; (3) interests (1) and (2) created by the same instrument; (4) heirs used in a technical sense as a word of limitation
rather than of purchase; (5) interests (1) and (2) of equal quality,
that is, both legal or both equitable.
The difficulties with the Rule arise in its application under a
specific set of facts. The fourth requirement has been perhaps the
most frequent source of controversy. 92 At common law the word
heirs is a term of art, presumed to be used as a word of limitation
indicating a whole line of unascertained persons to take in succession. 3 Construction of the deed or will as a whole may indicate,
however, that the transferor intended to use heirs as a word of purchase denoting the particular individuals who will take their estate
directly from the transferor and not by succession.9 4 For example, a
conveyance "to A, remainder to X, Y, and Z, heirs of his body"
would not call for the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case,
despite the use of the word heirs9 s The obvious intention of the
transferor is to use heirs of his body to denote the particular individuals named. In many situations the intent of the transferor in
using heirs is not so obvious.9 6
A further complication arises, because in a transfer by will it is
not necessary, even at common law, to use the word heirs in order to
create an estate in fee simple absolute or an estate in fee tail.y In
many jurisdictions the same rule applies to a transfer by deed. 98
Construction of the instrument as a whole may reveal that the transferor intended issue or children to mean heirs or heirs of the body.
Thus a limitation "to A for life, remainder to the issue of A" will
call for application of the Rule in Shelley's Case if it is evident that
issue was intended to mean heirs in its technical sense.99
92.

2 id. at 91; 47 Am. JUR. Rule in Shelley's Case 800 (1943).

93. Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 515, 175 So. 501, 504 (1937): "It is
essential to the operation of the rule in Shelley's Case that the 'heirs,' 'heirs of
the body' etc., to whom the future limitation is made shall mean, not particular
designated living persons, nor even one or two or more future generations of successors, but that indefinite line of successors through the ages, which is necessary

in law in order to make the words words of limitation, and which is meant when
we say that we are the heirs of the body of descendants of Adam, the idea of
which, in Biblical language is conveyed by such phrases as 'the children of Israel,'
'the seed of Abraham,' etc."
94. See 47 AM. JUR. The Rule in Shelley's Case 802, n.8, for cases concerning
heirs of body and bodily heirs as words of purchase.

95. See Braswell v. Downs, 11 Fla. 62 (1864).
96. See, e.g., Vogt v. Graff, 222 U.S. 404 (1911); Omohundo v. Talley, 100 Fla.
1553, 131 So. 393 (1930); Caulk v. Fox, 13 Fla. 148 (1869); Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105
(1860).
97. Accord, 2 BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIES *115.
98.

RMESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§§39,

59

(1936).

99. Hertz v. Abrahams, 110 Ga. 707, 36 S.E. 409 (1900); Trumbull v. Trum-
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The Rule in Shelley's Case is not a rule of construction.100 Traditionally it is a substantive rule of property, which takes effect
regardless of the intent of the transferor. 10' Once the court determines that the transferor intended to use the word heirs in its
technical sense and that the four other requirements for application
of the Rule are present, the Rule must be applied.
A conveyance of Blackacre "to A for life, to B for life, remainder
to the heirs of A" will, through the operation of the Rule in Shelley's
Case, give A the remainder in fee simple absolute. 10 2 A then has a
life estate and a remainder in fee, but the two cannot merge because
of B's intervening life estate. If B should predecease A, A's two estates
will merge and he will have a fee simple absolute. Similarly, a conveyance "to A for life, to B for life, remainder to the heirs of the
body of A" calls for the application of the Rule in Shelley's Case.
Through the operation of the Rule, A has a remainder in fee tail;
but the doctrine of merger cannot operate to merge A's life estate
and remainder in fee tail unless B predeceases A.10 3
Status of the Rule in America
The Rule in Shelley's Case was adopted by most American jurisdictions as part of the common law.104 The Rule has been widely
criticized in this country as antiquated' 0 ' and useless.20 6 The fact
bull, 149 Mass. 200, 21 N.E. 366 (1889); Allen v. Craft, 109 Ind. 476, 482 (1886)
(dictum); 47 AM. JuR. Rule in Shelley's Case §17 (1943).
100. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §344 (3d ed. 1939); 47 AM. JUR. Rule in
Shelley's Case 811 (1943); see Annot., 7 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1109 (1906). Contra: Albin v.
Parmele, 70 Neb. 740, 98 N.W. 29 (1904); Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 770, 167
So. 669, 674 (1936) (dictum); Smith v. Hastings, 29 Vt. 240, 241 (1857) (dictum).
101. Depler v. Ayer, 312 Ill. 537, 144 N.E. 212 (1924); Teal v. Richardson, 160
Ind. 119, 66 N.E. 435 (1902); Crockett v. Robinson, 46 N.H. 454 (1866); Brown v.
Bryant, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 454, 44 S.W. 399 (1897); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 84
(3d ed. 1929).

102. 2

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

87 (3d ed. 1929).

103. Ibid.
104. See, e.g., Crockett v. Robinson, supra note 101; Brown v. Bryant, supra
note 101.
105. E.g., Doyle v. Andis, 127 Iowa 36, 72, 102 N.W. 177, 189 (1905) (dissenting opinion), "a Gothic column found among the remains of feudality"; Stamper
v. Stamper, 121 N.C. 251, 254, 28 S.E. 20, 22 (1897) (dictum), "the Don Quixote of
the law, which like the last knight errant of chivalry, has long since survived every
case that gave it birth and now wanders aimlessly through the reports, still vigorous,
but equally useless and dangerous."
106. E.g., Doyle v. Andis, supra note 105, at 63, 102 N.V. at 186: "The most
skillful of the captive brickmakers in Egypt could not make bricks without straw,
and the most expert legal dialectician who undertakes to clothe the rule in
Shelley's Case with the varnish of plausibility finds himself confronted with a
poverty of material compared with which the destitution of the oppressed Israelites
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that the Rule usually operates in direct contravention of the donor's
intent has made it unpopular with courts' 0 7 and legal writerso8 alike.
The obvious intent of a donor who conveys "to B for life, remainder
to the heirs of B" is that B take only a life estate. If B's donor in
this example had intended that B take an estate in fee simple absolute, he would have conveyed to B in fee in the first instance. It is
doubtful that any donor relies on the operation of the Rule in
Shelley's Case to enlarge the estate of the immediate donee to an
estate in fee simple or fee tail when the same result can be achieved
directly by conveyance in fee or in fee tail.
Critics of the Rule in Shelley's Case have pointed out the ease
with which the Rule may be avoided by elimination of any one of
the five requirements for its operation. 0 9 If A wishes to convey a life
estate to B and a remainder to the heirs of B, he can do so by conveying to B by one instrument and to the heirs of B by another. A
conveyance "to X as trustee to hold and manage Blackacre, paying
the income to B for life, and at his death to convey to the heirs of
B" would also avoid the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case,
because B's interest is equitable and the interest of B's heirs is legal.
These and other possibilities" 0 suggest that the Rule in Shelley's Case
often operates as a trap for the unwary and penalizes those who attempt to convey or devise their property without competent legal
advice."'
England abolished the Rule in Shelley's Case in 1925.112 As of
January 1, 1947, thirty-six American jurisdictions"a3 had enacted
was a wasteful abundance"; Note, 4 FORDHAm L. REv. 316, 326 (1935). Contra,
Hammer v. Smith, 22 Ala. 433, 441 (1907) (dictum); Hardage v. Stroope, 48 Ark.
303, 309, 24 S.W. 490, 492 (1893) (dictum).
107. Siceloff v. Redman, 26 Ind. 251, 260 (1866) (dictum); see 29 L.R.A. (n.s.),
Note on the Rule in Shelley's Case 965, 1039 (1911).
108. Foster, The Rule in Shelley's Case in Nebraska, 8 NEB. L. BuLL. 124,
145-46 (1929); Trumbull, Precedent Versus Justice, 27 Am. L. REv. 321, 325 (1893);
Comm. on Law Reform Rep., 4 ANN. REP. OF PA. BAR Ass'N 27, 32 (1898).
109. See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §346 (3d ed. 1939); Foster, supra note 108,
at 160 n.89: "The Rule in Shelley's Case does not prohibit a result. It penalizes
a method."
I10. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §312, comment k (1940).
111. Doyle v. Andis, 127 Iowa 36, 69, 102 N.W. 177, 189 (1905) (dissenting
opinion): "The inherent ineradicable vice by which the rule in Shelley's Case is
differentiated from all our hitherto accepted rules of law is that it gives to words
a meaning and effect diametrically opposed to their universally accepted meaning
among the people, including people of education and experience who use and
understand the English language, and thus creates a snare by which the average
person, learned and unlearned, finds it impossible to express his intent, no matter
how lucidly it be stated, with any certainty that it will be respected by the
courts."

112.
113.

Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, §131.
RESTATEIENT, PROPERTY §313, special note 1 (1940, Supp. 1948) (Ala.,
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statutes wholly or partially abrogating the Rule. The courts of
Hawaii 14 and Vermont"l5 early held that the Rule was not a part of
their law. Since statutes abolishing the Rule in Shelley's Case are
not retroactive, cases continue to arise involving transfers that became
operative prior to the effective date of any statute abolishing the
Rule."16
THE RuLE IN FLORIDA

The Florida Supreme Court has held that the Rule in Shelley's
Case is in force in this state, 17 but the majority of the cases decided
prior to the abolition of the Rule in Florida" s did not apply it because one or more of the requirements for its application were missing.
Russ v. Russ," 9 decided in 1860, involved devises of slaves to each
of the testator's children, A, B, and C. The gift to each child was
in the form "to A and the heirs of his body." Item 14 of the will
provided that "in the event of the death of ... [A, B, or C] without
heirs of their body of the one so dying, . . .his or her property be

equally divided between the survivors of them.""'1 The Court held
that this paragraph referred to a definite failure of issue. Construing
the will as a whole, the Court was satisfied that the testator used the
word heirs in its non-technical sense to mean children; hence the
Rule in Shelley's Case did not apply. McLeod v. Dell121 and Braswell
v. Downs 22 involved gifts of slaves to A for life, remainder to his
children. In neither case was the Rule in Shelley's Case applied. The
Court found that the use of the word children and the context in
which it was used indicated that the donor contemplated a definite
failure of issue.
Although at common law the Rule in Shelley's Case applies only
Ariz., Cal., Conn., D.C., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Md., Mass., Mich.,
Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N. Dak., Ohio, Okla.,
Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S. Dak., Tenn., Va., W. Va., Wis.).
114. Thurston v. Allen, 8 Hawaii 392 (1891).
115. Smith v. Hastings, 29 Vt. 240 (1857).
116. E.g., National Turpentine & Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills, 57 So. 2d 838 (Fla.
1952); Smith v. Hanna, 215 S.C. 520, 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949); Stephenson v. Knutz,
131 W. Va. 599, 49 S.E.2d 235 (1948).
117. Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937); Omohundro v.
Talley, 100 Fla. 1533, 131 So. 398 (1930); Arnold v. Wells, 100 Fla. 1470, 131 So.
400 (1930).
118. Story v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934);
Omohundro v. Talley, supra note 117; Braswell v. Downs, 11 Fla. 62 (1864) (applying Georgia law); McLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 427 (1861); Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105
(1860).
119. 9 Fla. 105 (1860).
120. Id. at 110.
121. 9 Fla. 427 (1861).
122. 11 Fla. 62 (1864) (applying Georgia law).
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23

the Florida Court in Russ, McLeod, and Braswell indi-

24
cated that the Rule could apply to personalty.1 Other American
authorities are in conflict as to the extent, if25any, of the application
of the Rule in Shelley's Case to personalty.
In Bross v. Bross126 and Story v. First National Bank and Trust
Co., 1 7 the Florida Court held that the Rule in Shelley's Case is intrusts. These decisions are in accord with
applicable to executory 28
the weight of authority.
In Arnold v. Wells1 9 the Court held that the Rule could not
operate to violate the statute prohibiting entailment in Florida. A
limitation sufficient at common law to give rise to an estate in fee
tail through the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case does not
create an estate in fee simple absolute. Instead, it gives rise to an
estate for life in the first taker, remainder in fee to those who become
the heirs of the body of the first taker at his death. Although the
Arnold decision has been criticized, 130 it appears that the result obtained more closely approximated the intent of the testator.
The Supreme Court of Florida has applied the Rule in Shelley's
Case in only two' 3' of the cases decided prior to abolition of the
Rule in Shelley's Case in Florida. 32 In Watts v. Clardy,"33 an 1848
case applying South Carolina law, the Florida Court held that a gift
of slaves to A for life, remainder to be divided equally among the
heirs of her body, gave A an absolute interest. The Court first applied the Rule in Shelley's Case to give A an interest analogous to an
estate in fee tail. A's interest was then enlarged to an absolute interest under the Rule, which was stated by the Court as follows:
"[W]here personal estate is bequeathed in language which, if applied to real estate, would create an estate tail, it vests absolutely in

the person who would be the immediate donee in tail

.

.1.3.4"3

The

123. 1 SniEs, FuTuRE INTrEssrS §22 (1936).
124. See Braswell v. Downs, 11 Fla. 62, 68 (1864) (applying Georgia law);
McLeod v. Dell, 9 Fla. 427, 440 (1861); Russ v. Russ, 9 Fla. 105, 128 (1860). See
also Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 770, 167 So. 669, 674 (1936) (dictum); 6 U. FLA.
L. REv. 578 (1953).
125. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 101 (3d ed. 1939); see Notes: 8 COLUM. L. REv.
573 (1908); 23 HARv. L. REv. 51 (1909).
126. 123 Fla. 758, 167 So. 669 (1936).
127. 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
128. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §353 (3d ed. 1939); see Shaw v. Robinson,
42 S.C. 342, 20 S.E. 161 (1894); Note, 23 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1910).
129. 100 Fla. 1470, 131 So. 400 (1930). See discussion at pp. 248-49 supra.
130. Redfern, Estates Tail in Florida, 6 FLA. L.J. 69, 76 (1932).
131. Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937); Watts v. Clardy, 2
Fla. 369 (1848) (applying S.C. law).
132. FLA. STAT. §689.17 (1959) (effective June 11, 1945).
133. 2 Fla. 369 (1848).
134. Id. at 390.
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rule that a purported entailment of personal property vests an absolute interest in the first donee has been generally followed in this
country and in England and has been stated in several Florida cases. 133
The second case arising prior to the abolition of the Rule in
Shelley's Case was Tankersley v. Davis,130 decided in 1937. This case
involved a limitation substantially in the form "to A for life, remainder to the surviving children of A in fee, and, in the event A
dies leaving no surviving children, to A's heirs in fee.' ' 37 A, who had
a daughter living at the time of the trial, claimed the property in fee
simple absolute through the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case.
The Court held that the Rule was inapplicable to the intermediate
remainder in fee given to A's children, because the words child or
children are not equivalent to the word heirs. A's child, therefore,
took a contingent remainder in fee, conditioned on her surviving A.
The Court held that the Rule in Shelley's Case did apply to the
final remainder in fee limited to the heirs of A. As a result of the
application of the Rule, A took a remainder in fee, which united with
her life estate, subject to open on the vesting of the intervening
estate of A's children. The Tankersley decision is in accord with
settled doctrine that the Rule in Shelley's Case operates on the
remainder interest limited to the heir or heirs of the body of the life
tenant, regardless of whether an intervening estate prevents complete
merger of the life estate and the remainder interest.138 The TankersIcy case also recognizes the principle that the Rule in Shelley's Case
will not operate to cut off interests intervening between a life estate
and a remainder limited to the heirs or heirs of the body of the life
tenant.
Statutory Changes
a. Estates in Fee Tail
The Rule in Shelley's Case as applied to give rise to an estate in
fee tail apparently was abrogated in Florida by the act of November
17, 1829, prohibiting entailment.' 39 This act did not specify the
result of a limitation sufficient at common law to create an estate
in fee tail through the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case. The
135. Bross v. Bross, 123 Fla. 758, 768, 167 So. 669, 673 (1936); McLeod v. Dell,
9 Fla. 427, 440 (1860).
136. 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937).
137. Id. at 514, 175 So. at 504.
138. See 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 87 (3d ed. 1939); 47 Ams. JUR. Rule in
Shelley's Case §23 (1943); Note, 45 YALE L.J. 354 (1935). But see Gehlback v.
Briegal, 359 Ill. 316, 194 N.E. 591 (1934).
139. FLA. Comp.GEN. LAWS §5481 (1927).
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Florida Supreme Court, however, in Arnold v. Wells held that a transfer "to A for life, remainder to the heirs of his body" created a life
estate in A and a remainder in those who became the heirs of A's
body at his death. The same result obtains under the act of November 17, 1829, as amended, effective July 1, 1941. The amended
40
statute provided:'
"No real estate shall be entailed in this state. Any instrument purporting to create an estate tail shall, notwithstanding
the rule in Shelly's case be deemed to create an estate for life
in the first taker (that is in the donee or tenant in tail) with
remainder per stirpes in the issue of the first taker in being
at the time of his death."
This statute is controlling as to transfers that became operative between July 1, 1941, and June 11, 1945, and it applies to estates in
fee tail arising with or without the aid of the Rule in Shelley's Case.
Thus the result of a limitation "to A for life, remainder to the heirs
of his body" and a limitation "to A and the heirs of his body" would
be the same under the 1941 statute. In both instances A would take
a life estate and the issue of A would take a contingent remainder
conditioned on their surviving A.
The act of July 1, 1941, was repealed, and the present version of
section 689.14 became effective June 11, 1945.141 This section has no
application to estates in fee tail arising through the operation of the
Rule in Shelley's Case. Another statute, section 689.17, also effective
June 11, 1945, was enacted to cover estates in fee tail, as well as estates
in fee simple absolute, arising under the operation of the Rule in
Shelley's Case. This section provides:14
"The rule in Shelley's case is hereby abolished. Any instrument purporting to create an estate for life in a person
with remainder to his heirs, lawful heirs, heirs of his body or
to his heirs described by words of similar import, shall be
deemed to create an estate for life with remainder per stirpes
to the life tenant's lineal descendants in being at the time
said life estate commences, but said remainder shall be subject
to open and to take in per stirpes other lineal descendants of
the life tenant who come into being during the continuance of
said life estate."
140. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20954, §2 at 2505.
141. FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1959): "No property, real or personal, shall be entailed
in this state. Any instrument purporting to create an estate tail, express or implied,
shall be deemed to create an estate for life in the first taker with remainder per
stirpes to the lineal descendants of the first taker in being at the time of his
death."
142. FLA. STAT. §689.17 (1959).
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Under this statute, a limitation of the type "to A for life, remainder
to the heirs of his body," results in A's taking a life estate. The lineal
descendants of A in being at the time the life estate commences take
a vested remainder that is subject to open and take in lineal descendants who come into being during the continuance of the life
estate.
Section 689.17 does not purport to cover limitations sufficient at
common law to create an estate in fee tail without the aid of the
Rule in Shelley's Case. Limitations of the type "to A and the heirs of
his body" continue under the present section 689.14 to create a life
estate in A, remainder in the issue of A who survive him.
The effect of a transfer "to A for life, remainder to the heirs of
his body," depends on the operative date of the transfer. If the transfer became operative after November 17, 1829, and prior to June 11,
1945, A takes a life estate and the issue of A take a contingent remainder, conditioned on their surviving A. If the transfer became
operative on or after June 11, 1945, the issue, or the lineal descendants of A in being at the time the life estate commences, take a
vested remainder, subject to open and take in lineal descendants
who come into being during the continuance of the life estate.
b. Estates in Fee Simple Absolute
Prior to June 11, 1945, the Rule in Shelley's Case, as applied to
give rise to an estate in fee simple absolute, was in force in Florida.143
Thus a transfer "to A for life, remainder to his heirs" that became
operative prior to June 11, 1945, resulted in A's taking an immediate
estate in fee simple absolute.
Section 689.17, effective June 11, 1945, abolished the Rule in
Shelley's Case. Under this statute a transfer "to A for life, remainder
to his heirs" creates a life estate in A and a remainder in the lineal
descendants of A in being at the time the life estate commences,
subject to open and take in lineal descendants of A who come into
being during the continuance of the life estate. The same result
obtains under section 689.17 in case of a limitation sufficient at common law to create an estate in fee tail through the operation of the
Rule in Shelley's Case. Thus, as to transfers operative on or after
June 11, 1945, there is no practical distinction in Florida between
a limitation sufficient at common law to create an estate in fee simple
absolute under the Rule and a limitation sufficient at common law to
create an estate in fee tail through the operation of the Rule.
Since the Rule was abolished by statute the Florida Supreme Court
143. National Turpentine & Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills, 57 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1952);
Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937).
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has decided two cases 4 involving its application to give rise to an
estate in fee simple absolute. Both cases dealt with transfers that
became operative before the Rule was abolished. In Elsasser v.
Elsasser,1"t5 decided in 1947, the Court held that the Rule in Shelley's
Case did not apply to a testamentary transfer into trust to pay a portion of the income to the testator's widow for life and on her death
to distribute a portion of the corpus to her heirs. The Court found
that the will created an equitable life estate in the testator's widow
and a legal remainder in her heirs, making the Rule inapplicable.
The most recent case involving the Rule in Shelley's Case is
National Turpentine & Pulpwood Corp. V. Mills, 4 6 decided in 1952.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's application
of the Rule in Shelley's Case to a 1936 transfer by deed to A during
the term of his natural life, title to vest in his heirs in fee simple,
share and share alike. Since the Rule applied, A received an immediate estate in fee simple absolute at the time of the conveyance
in 1936; and a subsequent grantee of A had fee simple title to the
land, good as against everyone, including the heirs of A.
Both Elsasser and National Turpentine involved transfers operative prior to the effective date of section 689.17. Neither case,
therefore, entailed the interpretation or application of this section.
No cases interpreting or applying section 689.17 have been found.
Nature of the Rule
There is an apparent conflict as to the nature of the Rule in
Shelley's Case in Florida. Although the Florida Supreme Court has
given no indication that it is applied other than as a rule of law,
a number of authorities147 have stated that in Florida the Rule in
Shelley's Case is a rule of construction rather than of law. The following dictum appears in Bross v. Bross: "The Rule in Shelley's Case
is a rule of construction rather than an arbitrary rule of law and does
not prevail over the intention of the testator in this State." 1 4 8 An
eminent Florida textwriter,1*9 a prominent member of The Florida
Bar, 50 and American Jurisprudence"' have stated that the view
144. National Turpentine & Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills, supra note 143; Elsasser
v. Elsasser, infra note 145.
145. 159 Fla. 696, 32 So. 2d 579 (1947).
146. 57 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1952).
147. National Turpentine 8:Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills, supra note 143; Tankersley v. Davis, supra note 143; Watts v. Clardy, 2 Fla. 869 (1848) (applying S.C.
law).
148. 123 Fla. 758, 770, 167 So. 669, 674 (1936).
149. 1 REDFERN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN FLORIDA 284 (3d
ed. 1957).
150. Rogers, Chapter 20,954, Acts of 1941, 15 FLA. L.J. 276, 277 (1941).
151. 47 AM%.
JUR. Estates §5, n.7 (1943).
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espoused by the Bross case is the law in Florida.
In Omohundro v. Talley the Court indicated that Florida follows
the traditional view that the Rule in Shelley's Case operates without
regard for the intent of the donor: 52
"There can be no question that the rule in Shelley's Case
was a common law rule of property when the common law was
adopted as the law of Florida and that the rule in Shelley's
Case as a rule of property has not been abridged, modified or
abolished by statute in this State. If the language above quoted
... should be construed as a limitation so that the construction
of the deed must be based on the Rule in Shelley's Case then
under such rule we would necessarily hold that the deed passed
a fee simple title .... "
Conflict as to the nature of the Rule in Shelley's Case is not
unique to Florida. As early as 1769 Lord Mansfield, in Perrin v.
Blake,153 attempted to establish that the Rule was one of construction.
His position was repudiated in Jesson v. Wrightl54 and Van Grutten
v. Foxwell,155 and the nature of the Rule in Shelley's Case as a rule
of law was reaffirmed. A small minority of American jurisdictions,66
attempting to avoid this harsh application, adopted the view of
Perrin v. Blake that the Rule was one of construction. However, the
majority of jurisdictionsI57 and the textwriters' 5 s have adhered to
the traditional view that the Rule in Shelley's Case is a rule of law.
Confusion as to the nature of the Rule has arisen from the fact
that courts often have been concerned with the intent of the donor
in using the word heirs.159 Once a court has determined that the
donor used the word heirs in its technical sense as a word of limitation and that the other requirements for the application of the
Rule in Shelley's Case are met, the Rule applies regardless of the
intent of the donor. Even an express provision stating that the donor
152. 100 Fla. 1553, 1559, 131 So. 398, 400 (1930) (dictum).
153. 1 BI. Win. 672, 96 Eng. Rep. 392 (K.B. 1769).
154. 2 Bli. 1, 4 Eng. Rep. 230 (H.L. 1820).
155. [1897] A.C. 658.
156. See AM. JUR. Rule in Shelley's Case §5 (1943); 29 L.R.A. (n.s.) 965, 1047
(1911); Annot., 7 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1109 (1906). See also Foster, supra note 108, at
131-43 (criticizing minority view).
157. See 47 AM. JUR. The Rule in Shelley's Case §5 and cases cited n.l (1943).
158. E.g., 1 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 198, 208-09 (1936); 2 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY §344 (3d ed. 1939); see Foster, supra note 108, at 133 n. 24, for list of
American and English textwriters following the majority view.
159. Foster, supra note 108, at 135-36; 47 AM. JUR. The Rule in Shelley's Case
796 (1943); 29 L.R.A. (n.s.) 965, 1054, 1060 (1911); see, e.g., I REDFERN, supra note
149, in which the author concludes that since the Florida Court may seek the
intent of a testator in using the word heirs, the Rule in Shelley's Case is a rule
of construction in Florida.
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does not desire the Rule to apply or that he intends that the first
donee shall have no interest whatsoever in the remainder will not
avoid the operation of the Rule. 160
The question of the nature of the Rule in Shelley's Case may yet
be presented to the Florida Court, and the Court may be tempted to
hold that the Rule is one of construction. Before adopting the
minority position, however, the Court should consider the "unspeakable quagmire" 18 1 that has arisen in other jurisdictions from the
attempt to apply an intent-defeating rule of law as a rule of construction.
CONcLUSION

Estates in fee tail are prohibited in Florida, and the Rule in
Shelley's Case has been abolished. A limitation sufficient at common
law to create an estate in fee tail without the aid of the Rule creates
in Florida today an estate for life in the first taker, remainder in the
life tenant's issue that become his heirs. A limitation sufficient at
common law to create an estate in fee tail, or an estate in fee simple
absolute, through the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case now
creates an estate for life in the first taker, remainder to the lineal
descendants of the life tenant in being at the time the life estate commences, subject to open and take in lineal descendants who come into
being during the continuance of the life estate.
The statutory treatment of estates in fee tail in Florida has been
162
criticized as piecemeal, inconsistent, and provocative of litigation.
Regardless of any changes that the legislature may make in the future,
the present statutes and their predecessors, inconsistent though they
may be, will continue to be controlling as to transfers within their
scope and period of effectiveness.
Application of the present Florida statutes and their predecessors
necessitates a preliminary determination that the transfer in question
would have created an estate in fee tail at common law, either with
or without the aid of the Rule in Shelley's Case, or that the limitation
in question would have created an estate in fee simple absolute
through the operation of the Rule. This determination cannot be
made without an understanding of the common law principles applicable to estates in fee tail and to the Rule in Shelley's Case.

160. Foster, supra note 108, at 132.
161. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §882 (2d ed. 1906).
162. Smith & Keathley, Future Interests in Florida, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 123, 141
(1956).
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